FYI...
Rogue ads lead to the ‘EzDownloaderpro’ PUA (Potentially Unwanted Application)
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http://www.webroot.c...ed-application/
Oct 22, 2013 - "We’ve just intercepted yet another rogue ad campaign, attempting to trick users into installing the EzDownloaderpro PUA (Potentially Unwanted Application). Primarily relying on catchy “Play Now, Download Now” banners, the visual social engineering tactic of this campaign is similar to other PUA related campaigns we’ve previously profiled...
Sample screenshot of the landing page:
>
https://www.webroot....cy-1024x490.png
Landing URL: lp.ezdownloadpro .info/sspcQA/ssa/ –
46.165.228.246
Domain name reconnaissance of the redirectors:
superfilesdocumentsy .asia/v944/?a=1 –
141.101.117.252; 141.101.116.252
applicationscenterforally .asia/v944/?INm –
108.162.197.34; 108.162.196.34
op.applicationscenterforally .asia/sspcQA/ssa/ ...
The following MD5 is also known to have been downloaded from the same IP (
108.162.197.34):
MD5: bc44e23e46fa4c3e73413c130d4f2018 *
Detection rate for the sample ‘pushed’ by the rogue Download page: MD5: e8c9c2db3514f375f74b60cb9dfcd4ef ** PUP.Optional.InstalleRex; Installerex/WebPick (fs)
Once executed, the sample phones back to:
r1.stylezip .info – 198.7.61.118
c1.stylezip .info – 198.7.61.118
i1.stylezip .info –
198.7.61.118
... Detection rate for the original EzDownloadpro executable: MD5: 292b53b745e3fc4af79924a3c11fcff0 *** Win32:InstalleRex-U [PUP]; MalSign.Skodna.Pick; PUP.Optional.EZDownloader.A
Sample screenshot of EzDownloadpro’s official Web site:
>
https://www.webroot...._Privacy_01.png
Unique PUA MD5s served based on multiple requests to the same URL (applicationscenterforally .asia/v944/?INm)..."
(More detail at the webroot URL.)
*
https://www.virustot...18cdc/analysis/
**
https://www.virustot...sis/1381845366/
***
https://www.virustot...c9589/analysis/
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https://www.virustot...46/information/
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https://www.virustot...52/information/
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https://www.virustot...52/information/
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https://www.virustot...34/information/
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https://www.virustot...34/information/
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https://www.virustot...18/information/
___
Fake ADP SPAM / abrakandabr .ru
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http://blog.dynamoo....akandabrru.html
22 Oct 2013 - "This
fake ADP spam leads to malware on abrakandabr .ru:
From: ClientService@ adp .com [ClientService@ adp .com]
Date: 22 October 2013 18:04
Subject: ADP RUN: Account Charge Alert
ADP Urgent Communication
Note ID: 33400
October, 22 2013
Valued ADP Partner
Account operator with ID 58941 Refused Yesterday Payroll Operation from your ADP account recently. Report(s) have been uploaded to the website:
Sign In here
Please see the following notes:
• Please note that your bank account will be debited within 1 banking day for the total shown on the Summary(s)...
Screenshot:
https://lh3.ggpht.co...0/adp-spam3.png
The link goes through a legitimate hacked site and then onto a malware landing page at [donotclick]abrakandabr .ru:8080/adp.report.php (if running Windows, else they get sent to adp .com). This is hosted on quite a lot of IP addresses:
69.46.253.241 (RapidDSL & Wireless, US)
91.205.17.80 (TOV Adamant-Bild, Ukraine)
111.68.229.205 (NTT Communications, Japan)
114.32.54.164 (Chunghwa Telecom, Taiwan)
118.163.216.107 (Chunghwa Telecom, Taiwan)
163.18.62.51 (TANET, Taiwan)
202.6.120.103 (TSKL, Kiribati)
203.80.16.81 (MYREN, Malaysia)
203.114.112.156(PhetchaboonHospital, Thailand)
210.56.23.100 (Commission For Science And Technology, Pakistan)
210.166.209.15 (Prox Communicator, Japan)
212.154.192.122 (Hoster.KZ, Kazakhstan)
213.214.74.5 (BBC Cable, Bulgaria)
As mentioned before, this is either the return of the infamous RU:8080 gang, or it is somebody -pretending- to be the gang. But one rather peculiar factor is that in this case the bad guys only seem to have a small pool of servers that have been compromised for some time, and don't seem to have added any news ones.
Recommended blocklist:
69.46.253.241
91.205.17.80
111.68.229.205
114.32.54.164
118.163.216.107
163.18.62.51
202.6.120.103
203.80.16.81
203.114.112.156
210.56.23.100
210.166.209.15
212.154.192.122
213.214.74.5
abrakandabr .ru
dynamooblog .ru
inkrediblehalk .ru
intro2seo .ru
hankoksuper .ru "
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http://threattrack.t...dp-invoice-spam
Oct 22, 2013 - "Subjects Seen:
Payroll Invoice
Typical e-mail details:
A copy of your ADP TotalSource Payroll Invoice for the following payroll is is attached in PDF file and available for viewing.
Year: 13
Week No: 08
Payroll No: 1
Malicious File Name and MD5:
invoice.zip (5B9EABC34B1A326F6491613E9FD6AAFD)
invoice_<random>.pdf.exe
(12C700409E6DB4A6E043BD3BBD3A1A21)
Screenshot:
https://gs1.wac.edge...C2sP1r6pupn.png
___
Fake Xerox WorkCentre emails lead to malware
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http://www.webroot.c...s-lead-malware/
Oct 22, 2013 - "We’ve intercepted a currently circulating malicious spam campaign, tricking users into thinking that they’ve received a scanned document sent from a Xerox WorkCentre Pro device. In reality, once users execute the
malicious attachment, the cybercriminal(s) behind the campaign gain complete control over the now infected host.
Sample screenshots of the spamvertised malicious email:
>
https://www.webroot....kCentre_Pro.png
Detection rate for the malicious attachment: MD5: 1a339ecfac8d2446e2f9c7e7ff639c56 * ... TROJ_UPATRE.AX; Heuristic.LooksLike.Win32.SuspiciousPE.J!89... phones back to:
smclan .com –
209.236.71.58 ... malicious domains are also currently responding to the same IP ..."
*
https://www.virustot...279f0/analysis/
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https://www.virustot...58/information/
Edited by AplusWebMaster, 22 October 2013 - 03:40 PM.