FYI...
Multiple Facebook SCAMS ...
-
http://www.hoax-slay...ewer-scam.shtml
April 30, 2013 - "Outline: Message being spammed across Facebook claims that users can follow a link to install an app that allows them to check who has been viewing their profile.
Brief Analysis: The message is an attempt to trick Facebook users into relinquishing control of their Facebook accounts to Internet scammers by submitting their Facebook authentication token. The scammers will use the compromised accounts to launch further spam and scam campaigns in the names of their victims. Any message that
claims that you can install an app to see who has viewed your profile is
likely to be a scam. Do not click on any links in these messages...
Detailed Analysis: This message, which is currently appearing on Facebook, claims that users can check out who has been viewing their Facebook profiles by clicking a link and installing a new app.
However, the message is a scam designed to trick users into temporarily handing control of their Facebook accounts to online scammers. Those who click the link will first be taken to a Facebook page with further "instructions" for procuring the app:
>
http://www.hoax-slay...ewer-scam-1.jpg
If victims follow the link on the page, they will next be taken to a second page that falsely claims that Facebook is now required to show users who has been viewing their profile:
>
http://www.hoax-slay...ewer-scam-2.jpg
Next, victims are taken to a "security check" and told that they must generate an "age verification code" before proceeding:
>
http://www.hoax-slay...ewer-scam-3.jpg
Users will then receive the following instructions:
>
http://www.hoax-slay...ewer-scam-4.jpg
Folllowed by this:
>
http://www.hoax-slay...ewer-scam-5.jpg
... by pasting the "age verification" code as instructed, users are in fact giving the scammers access to their Facebook accounts, including their Friends list. The code is the victim's Facebook authentication token, which can then be used by the criminals to temporarily hijack the Facebook account. The compromised accounts are then used to distribute more of the same scam messages on Facebook... victims will be taken onward to various bogus survey pages and enticed to participate, supposedly as a further prerequisite to getting the promised profile viewer app... In reality, the profile viewer app does not exist... Some versions use the promise of a profile viewer to lead victims directly to a scam survey page. Other versions try to trick users into first installing a rogue Facebook application that will send spam and scam messages to all of their friends.
Do not trust any message that claims that you can click a link and install an app to see who has viewed your profile. If you receive such a message, delete it."
___
UK banks targeted with Trojans and social engineering
-
https://www.net-secu...ews.php?id=2477
April 30, 2013 - "... Trusteer’s security team recently analyzed
a Ramnit variant that is targeting a UK bank with a clever one-time password (OTP) scam. The malware stays idle until the user successfully logs into their account, at which time it presents them with one of the following messages:
>
https://www.net-secu...er-042013-1.jpg
- or:
>
https://www.net-secu...er-042013-2.jpg
While the user is reading the message, Ramnit connects to its command and control server and obtains the details of a designated mule account. This is followed by the initiation of a wire transfer to the money mule. But, there is still one more obstacle in the way of the malware – to complete the transaction a One Time Password (OTP) must be entered by the user. To overcome this requirement Ramnit displays the following message:
>
https://www.net-secu...er-042013-3.jpg
The temporary receiver number in the message is in fact the mule’s account number. The user then receives the SMS and thinking that he must complete the “OTP service generation”, enters their OTP. By entering the OTP, the user unknowingly enables the malware to complete the fraudulent transaction and finalize the payment to the mule account. This is yet another example of how well designed social engineering techniques help
streamline the fraud process... the authors most likely used ‘find and replace’ to switch the two words that resulted in the grammatical mistake “a option.” Nevertheless, by changing multiple entries in the FAQ section Ramnit* demonstrates that its authors did not leave anything to chance – even if the victim decides to go the extra step, Ramnit is already there..."
*
http://www.trusteer....nancial-malware
___
Malicious PDFs on the rise
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http://blog.trendmic...fs-on-the-rise/
Apr 29, 2013 - "... we continue to see CVE-2012-0158 in heavy use, we have noticed
increasing use of an exploit for Adobe Reader (CVE-2013-0640)... files used dnsport.chatnook .com, inter.so-webmail .com, and
223.25.242.45 as their command-and-control servers... Our research indicates that attackers engaged in APT campaigns may have adapted the exploit made infamous by the MiniDuke campaign and have incorporated it into their arsenal. At the same time, we have found that other APT campaigns seem to have developed their own methods to exploit the same vulnerability. The increase in malicious PDF’s exploiting CVE-2013-0640 may indicate the start of shift in APT attacker behavior away from using malicious Word documents that exploit the now quite old CVE-2012-0158."
(More detail at the trendmicro URL above.)
-
https://blogs.techne...Redirected=true
29 Apr 2013
Graph:
https://www.microsof..._exploits/2.png
___
Phish target Apple IDs
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http://blog.trendmic...-phishing-bait/
Apr 30, 2013 - "Phishers appear to have concentrated their fire on a relatively new target: Apple IDs. In recent days, we’ve seen a spike in
phishing sites that try to steal Apple IDs... Technically, the sites were only compromised, but not hacked (as the original content was not modified). It’s possible, however, that the sites may be hacked or defaced if the site stays compromised... the directory contains pages that spoof the Apple ID login page fairly closely:
>
http://blog.trendmic.../fake_apple.jpg
We’ve identified a total of 110 compromised sites, all of hosted at the IP address
70.86.13.17, which is registered to an ISP in the Houston area. Almost all of these sites have not been cleaned:
>
http://blog.trendmic...13/04/chart.png
The graph above shows the increase in phishing sites targeting Apple IDs. We’ve seen attacks targeting not only American users, but also British and French users. Some versions of this attack ask not only for the user’s Apple ID login credentials, but also their
billing address and other personal and credit card information. It will eventually result in a page that states that access has been restored, but of course the information has been stolen. One can see in the sample page below how it asks for credit card information:
>
http://blog.trendmic...credit_card.jpg
Users may be redirected to these phishing sites via spam messages that state that the user’s account will expire unless their information is subject to an “audit”, which not only gets users to click on the link, it puts them in a mindset willing to give up information.
>
http://blog.trendmic.../apple_mail.jpg
One way to identify these phishing sites, is that
the fake sites do not display any indications that you are at a secure site (like the padlock and “Apple Inc. [US]” part of the toolbar), which you can see in this screenshot of the legitimate site:
>
http://blog.trendmic...4/legitsite.jpg
The screenshot above is from Chrome, but Internet Explorer and Firefox both have similar ways to indicate secure sites. For the phishing messages themselves, legitimate messages should generally have matching domains all around – where they were sent from, where any links go to, etcetera. Mere appearance of the email isn’t enough to judge, as very legitimate-looking emails have been used maliciously. We also encourage users to enable the two-factor authentication that Apple ID recently introduced, for added protection..."
___
Something evil on 96.126.108.132
-
http://blog.dynamoo....6126108132.html
30 April 2013 - "These sites are on (or are likely to be created on)
96.126.108.132 (Linode, US) which is a known malware server [1] [2] [3]. Blocking this IP would be wise. Some of the domains are rather.. unusual
..."
(Long list at the dynamoo URL above.)
1)
https://www.virustot...32/information/
2)
https://palevotracke...=96.126.108.132
3)
http://support.clean...=96.126.108.132
___
Fake "Requested Reset of Yoyr PayPal Password" SPAM / frustrationpostcards .biz
-
http://blog.dynamoo....l-password.html
29 Apr 2013 - "This
fake PayPal spam leads to malware on frustrationpostcards .biz:
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2013 13:22:03 -0500
From: "service @paypalmail .com" [chichisaq0 @emlreq.paypalmail .com]
Subject: Requested Reset of Yoyr PayPal Password
Your account will stay on hold untill password reset.
How to reset your PayPal password
Hello [redacted],
To get back into your PayPal account, you'll have to create a new password.
It's easy:
Click the link below to open a secure browser window.
Confirm that you're the owner of the account, and then follow the instructions.
Reset your password now
If you didn't requested help with your password, let us know immediately. Reporting it is important because it helps us prevent fraudsters from stealing your information.
Help Center | Security Center
Please don't reply to this email. It'll just confuse the computer that sent it and you won't get a response.
Copyright © 2013 PayPal, Inc. All rights reserved. PayPal is located at 2211 N. First St., San Jose, CA 95132.
PayPal Email ID 2A7X1
The link goes through a legitimate but hacked site to land on a malicious payload at [donotclick]frustrationpostcards .biz/news/institutions-trusted.php (report here*) hosted on the following IPs:
82.236.38.147 (PROXAD Free SAS, France)
83.212.110.172 (Greek Research and Technology Network, Greece)
130.239.163.24 (Umea University, Sweden)...
Blocklist:
82.236.38.147
83.212.110.172
130.239.163.24 ..."
*
http://urlquery.net/....php?id=2230181
Screenshot:
https://www.net-secu...ke-30042013.jpg
___
Fake Microsoft Security Scam
-
http://blog.webroot....-security-scam/
April 30, 2013 - "... we have seen an increase in
fake Microsoft scams, which function by tricking people into thinking that their PC is infected. With these types of scams there are a number of things to remember.
1. Microsoft will never call you telling you that your PC is infected
2. Never allow strangers to connect to your PC
3. Do not give any credit card info to somebody claiming to be from Microsoft...
The current scam will display a webpage that is very similar to the one in Figure 1. There are a number of ways to figure out that this is a false alert. The first is that
it’s a website message and not a program; the second is that
the location of the web site will be a random string of letters.
1)
https://webrootblog....owser_alert.jpg
More details: These websites will normally only stay active for 24-48hrs before they are pulled down. The websites’ primary function is to get you to run a “removal tool” called “security cleaner”. This file is the infection and, if ran, will infect the PC and start displaying pop-ups (like the one in Figure 2).
2)
https://webrootblog....3/04/fakeav.jpg
... Infection detected:
c:\users\owner\appdata\local\microsoft\windows\temporary internet files\content.ie5\wckxi56g\security_cleaner[1].exe
MD5: 68D9F9C6741CCF4ED9F77EE0275ACDA9 * ... Virus Total... a number of infections that would have been prevented if Windows was up to date. Microsoft is constantly updating Windows to patch various security updates..."
*
https://www.virustot...b0a29/analysis/
File name: qdg.exe
Detection ratio:
28/46
Analysis date: 2013-04-27
Link:
http://www.microsoft...acy/msname.aspx
___
Fake Wire Transfer SPAM / Payment reeceipt.exe / 78.139.187.6
-
http://blog.dynamoo....2-canceled.html
30 Apr 2013 - "This
fake wire transfer spam comes with
a malicious attachment:
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2013 15:27:44 -0500 [16:27:44 EDT]
From: Federal Reserve [alerts @federalreserve .gov]
Subject: Your Wire Transfer 82932922 canceled
The Wire transfer , recently sent from your bank account , was not processed by the FedWire.
Transfer details attached to the letter.
This service is provided to you by the Federal Reserve Board. Visit us on the web at website
To report this message as spam, offensive, or if you feel you have received this in error, please send e-mail to email address including the entire contents and subject of the message. It will be reviewed by staff and acted upon appropriately
In this case there is an attachment PAYMENT RECEIPT 30-04-2013-GBK-75.zip which contains a malicious executable crafted to look like a Word document called Payment reeceipt.exe . This executable has a so-so VirusTotal detection rate of 29/46*.
The malware has the following checksums according to Comodo CAMAS**:
Size 371712
MD5 0a3723483e06dcf7e51073972b9d1ef3
SHA1 293735a9fdc7e786b12c2ef92f544ffc53a0a0e7
SHA256 0eb5dd62e32bc6480bae638967320957419ba70330f0b9ad5759c2d3f25753dd
Anubis has a pretty detailed report*** of what this malware does. In particular, you might want to monitor network traffic to and from
78.139.187.6 (Caucasus Online, Georgia) which seems to be a C&C server. This IP has also been seen here****. There are several other IPs involved, but these look like DSL subscribers with dynamic address, so probably a part of a botnet. For the sake of completeness they are:
64.231.249.250
69.183.226.70
78.139.187.6
81.133.189.232
123.237.234.67 ...."
*
https://www.virustot...sis/1367354089/
File name: Payment reeceipt.exe
Detection ratio:
29/46
Analysis date: 2013-04-30
**
http://camas.comodo....759c2d3f25753dd
***
http://anubis.isecla...amp;format=html
****
http://blog.dynamoo....ation-spam.html
Edited by AplusWebMaster, 30 April 2013 - 05:07 PM.